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An Empirical Evaluation of the
Disequilibrium Real Wage Rate Hypothesis 1
Summary
The rise in the share of labor costs in value added and in the
unemployment rate in many industrial countries during the 1970s and
early 1980s has led many observers to conclude that real wages are now
too high and a source of "classical" unemployment. These conclusions
are not necessarily valid The increase in the labor share could be
warranted by long—run changes in production techniques, in the price of
energy, or in the relative availability of labor and capital. Moreover,
the observed unemployment could be structural or Keynesian, rather than
classical. In this paper, a production function approach is used to
examine these possibilities and to subject the disequilibrium realwage
hypothesis to a more rigorous empirical test than has been conducted in
the past. Both the capital stock and the exchange rate are takenas
given and the study focuses only on the manufacturing sector.
The results indicate that for France, the Federal Republic of
Germany, and the United Kingdom, there are indeed strong reasons to
believe that real wages in the manufacturing sector are now toohigh, in
the sense of being incompatible with "high employment.' Inparticular,
the study did not find any evidence that a large part of the actual
increase in the share of labor costs in value added was warranted by
long—run changes in production techniques, in the price of energy, or
in the relative availability of labor and capital. On the otherhand,—2—
f or Canada and the United States, the results indicate that there is no
real wage problem for the manufacturing sector as a whole, although there
may of course be a problem in specific industries.For Japan and Italy,
the conclusions have to be more nuanced. For Japan, the results indicate
that the large increase in the share of labor costs in value added is not
fully warranted by concomitant changes in the factors considered inthe
study. At the same time, the initial labor share was so small thatthis
increase may be less of a problem than in France, the Federal Republic
of Germany, and the United Kingdom. For Italy, the results suggest that
there is no real wage problem, but poor data prevent a firm conclusion in
this regard.
I. Introduction
The present paper examines the validity of the hypothesis that the
level of the real wage rate, inclusive of employers' expenditures for
social insurance and employment or payroll taxes, is a major obstacle to
a return to "high employment" in industrial countries.2 It does this
by estimating a production function, solving it for the real wage rate
that would be consistent with the high—employment level of labor input
given the existing capital stock, and comparing this"warranted" wage
to the actual real wage. This exercise is carried out for the manu-
facturing sector of the seven largest industrial countries (theUnited
States, Canada, Japan, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy,
and the United Kingdom). In each country, the estimate of the high—
employment level of labor input makes due allowance for regionaland—3—
skill mismatches between labor supply and demand. As a by—product, the
study casts some light on the relative contribution of low capital
formation and high energy prices to the decline in the growth of labor
productivity during the 1970s and early 1980s.
The disequilibrium real wage rate hypothesis is largely based on the
observation that, at least in manufacturing, the real wage rate defined
from the employer's standpoint——that is, the nominal wage rate deflated
by the value added deflator rather than the consumer price index——has
tended to grow faster than labor productivity during the past decade and
a half, leading to a rise in the share of labor costs in value added and
a corresponding decline in the capital share. 3 (See Table 1.) However,
while suggestive, this development can hardly be viewed as a proof that
the real wage rate is now too high. It could be that the increase in the
labor share was warranted by long—run changes in production techniques,
in the price of energy, or in the relative availability of labor and
capital. The production function approach allows us to examine these
possibilities and to subject the hypothesis to a more rigorous test. 4
The purview of the paper is limited in three respects. First, only
the manufacturing sector is considered. Obviously, conditions in that
sector are not necessarily indicative of conditions in other sectors.
Furthermore, the narrow focus on only one sector leads to a number of
conceptual problems. For example, it is difficult to define precisely
the high—employment level of labor input for the manufacturing sector.
Second, the capital stock is viewed as an exogenous variable and no—4—
Table 1. Labor Productivity and Real Wage Rates in Manufacturing 1/
(Average rate of growth in percent per annum;
for S1,average level in percent)
1956—69 1970—72 1973—82 1956—69 1970—72 1973—82
United States Canada
Y 3.7 1.8 1.1 5.6 4.0 1.2
K 2.8 3.2 2.0 4.3 4.4 2.2
L 1.2 —1.7 —0.5 1.3 —0.3 —0.3
Y/L 2.5 3.6 1.6 4.2 4.3 1.5
w/p 2.7 3.3 2.4 4.5 4.0 2.0
SL 75.3 76.9 77.7 66.7 69.2 67.7
Japan France
Y 16.1 10.1 6.3 7.0 6.7 2.3
K 11.8 16.1 5.1 4.1 6.0 3.4
L 4.8 0.1 —0.3 1.0 0.7 —2.2
Y/L 10.8 10.2 6.6 6.0 6.0 4.6
w/p 10.2 14.5 8.7 5.2 8.6 5.5
SL 44.7 46.0 55.5 61.3 62.6 68.9
Germany Italy
Y 5.7 2/ 3.1 1.3 7.7 4.1 3.2
K 9.1 2/ 6.9 1.8 3.9 3.9 1.4
L —0.3 2/ —0.9 —2.8 1.9 —1.2 —0.9
Y/L 6.0 2/ 4.0 4.2 5.8 5.4 4.1
w/p 5.7 2/ 6.6 5.2 6.7 9.1 4.0
SL 65.3 3/ 67.2 71.4 60.2 69.3 70.9
United Kingdom
Y 3.2 0.4 —1.2
K 4.7 4.0 0.5
L —0.5 —4.0 —3.8
Y/L 3.7 4.6 2.7
w/p 4.3 5.0 3.7
SL 70.5 74.4 79.1
Source: See the Statistical Appendix.
1/ Notation: Y, real value added; K, gross fixed capital stock in constant prices;
L, labor in man—hours; w/p, real wage rate calculated by usingthe deflator of value
added; SL, share of labor costs in value added originating in manufacturing.
2/ Average rate of growth during 1962—69.
3/ Average level during 1961—69.—5—
attempt is made to explain investment. It is possible that a disequi—
librium real wage rate reduces investment, which would in turn reduce the
growth of the warranted real wage rate.The result could be a vicious
circle with higher and higher unemployment. In the absence of an expla-
nation of investment, these dynamic considerations are outside the scope
of the present paper. 5 Third, prices in the goods markets, including
prices of manufactures, intermediate inputs used in the manufacturing
sector, and consumer goods, are also viewed as exogenous variables.
This last assumption implies that the exchange rate is taken as given,
a point to which we return in the concluding section.
Section II of the paper describes the theoretical framework that is
used in the empirical investigation. Section III discusses the empirical
results. Some concluding remarks are presented in Section IV.
II. The Theoretical Framework
In the first part of this section, a simple production model is used
to clarify the main issues under consideration. Then two more complex
models are derived to provide a realistic framework for the empirical
analysis. Model A is limited to two factors of production, labor and
capital, while Model B views energy as a complement to capital. Finally,
the major difficulties inherent in the measurement of the actual flows
of labor and capital services, as well as in the measurement of the
high—employment flow of labor services, are considered.
1. A simple model
The main production characteristics of a large and diversified
manufacturing sector can be represented by the following aggregate CES—6—
(Constant Elasticity of Substitution) production functionwith constant
returns to scale:
(1) y =yeAt [(1 -) L+
where Y =netoutput (real value—added)
t=timetrend for disembodied productivity change
L =flowof labor services
K =flowof capital services.
This specification assumes that the marginal rate of substitution
between labor and capital is effectively independent of the amountof
raw materials (N) and energy (E) being used,that is, it assumes that a
change in the price of N or E does not call for a changein K/L. Under
such conditions, N and E are said to be "weakly separable'from K and L,
and one can study the relation between K, L, and thevalue—added Y with-
out taking account of N and E. (See Leontieff (1947).)
Aside from the weak separability assumption, function (1) is fairly
general. In particular, it allows the elasticityof substitution between
labor and capital (n,rj=1/(1+ ))totake any value except for the
exact value of one for which the function is notdefined. The function
approaches the Cobb—Douglas function asapproaches zero. It does
assume that technology is the "putty—putty" typewith the same possi—
bility to choose among different ratios of labor to capitalservices at
the time of purchase of equipment and throughout the workinglife of the
equipment, rather than the "putty—clay" typewith the choice becoming
more limited after purchase. However, this assumptiondoes not seem to
do too much violence to the facts. Even after purchase,there is often—7--
considerable room for variations in the ratio of labor to capital ser—
vices, so that, whenever there is a sudden decline in the economically
useful capital stock, the demand for labor does not necessarily decline
as assumed in the "putty—clay" model.
The assumption of constant returns to scale is also acceptable
because in the seven countries under consideration here the manufacturing
sector is already so large that a further increase in its size does not
per se entail important economies of scale. As new products and new
production techniques appear, there is often an opportunity for further
economies of scale. However, such changes occur gradually over time and
are unrelated to the levels of capital and labor in the manufacturing
sector. Thus, these changes are more appropriately taken into account
by the rate of disembodied productivity change, A, than by the intro-
duction of economies of scale in the aggregate production function. 6
To simplify the theoretical analysis as well as the future econo-
metric estimation, it is convenient to work with a linear approximation
to equation (1). This approximation is obtained by writing equation (1)
in log form, applying a Taylor's series expansion to in Y about a value
ofwhich is then allowed asymptotically to approach zero, and dropping
the terms involving powers ofhigher than one. This simplification
involves no loss of economic realism because the new function provides
a good approximation to the CES function over the relevant range of
variations for L, K, and the various parameters (Kmenta (1967)). The
new function is:—8—
(2) in Y =iny + A t ÷ (1 -) inL +in K —1/2$(1 —)ó[in (K/L)]2
If K is given, entrepreneurs will recruit labor up to the point








the equilibrium condition (3) is equivalent to:
(5) alnY..wL.s =i—s
alnL pY L K
where SL is the "labor share of income' and SK the capital share. We
refer to SL as the labor share of income becauseit is the expression
used in most of the economic literature. However, as noted above,
what really matters from the standpoint of the demand for labor is the
cost of labor so that employment or payroll taxes have to be included
in w and SL, even though they do not represent an income for labor.
After carrying out the partial differentiation of (2), equation (5)
can be written:
(6) SL =1—S+ 5 (1 —6)in (K/L)
To have equilibrium in the labor market, L must correspond to its
high—employment value, L. The corresponding equilibrium labor share is:
(7) SL =1—6+6 (1 —6)in (K/L)—9—
The high—employment real wage rate (w/p) is obtained by calculating
the high—employment level of output (Y) from equation (2) and inserting
Y and L in equation (5). In log form, the result is:
(8)in (7)= in(Y/i)+in (L)
=iny +At + in (K/L) —1/2 (1 —)S[in(K/L)]2
+in (FL)
From equations (7) and (8), we conciude that an increase in the high—
employment labor share (SL) resulting from a rise in the real wage rate in
excess of the rise in labor productivity is at times warranted. In this
simple model, it is the evolution of K/L and the value ofthat determine
if it is warranted. More precisely, L is positively related to K/L if
is positive (that is, if Ti<1) and negatively related to this ratio if
is negative (that is, if ri > 1). The high—employment equilibrium real
wage rate (w/p) is positively related to Y/L and to SL. More funda-
mentally, w/p is increasing at a rate which corresponds to the rate of
disembodied productivity change only if K/L is constant. If K/L is
rising, this will boost up the increase in w/p, especially ifis
positive and large.
The other conclusion to be derived from this simple model is that,
while the gap between the actual real wage rate (wlp) and the warranted
rate (w/p) is a meaningful indicator of the magnitude of the disequi-
librium, the gap between the actual and the warranted labor share can be
misleading. Looking back to equation (6), it is clear that an undue rise
in the real wage rate that leads to a decline in the demand for labor,— 10—
andtherefore a rise in K/L, could ultimately result in a decline rather
than a rise in the labor share. This will be the case wheneveris
negative (i.e., n > 1). In the more likely case whereis positive, the
labor share will rise, but only by a small amount ifis small. Thus,
neither the sign nor the magnitude of the deviation between the actual
and the warranted labor share can be taken as reliable indicators of a
real wage rate disequilibrium. When focusing on the share, one should
compare the warranted share (SL) to the "normalized" share (SL) cor-
responding to the actual real wage rate and the labor productivity at
high employment (i.e., L =LwIYp). The information provided by this
latter comparison is, of course, the same as the information provided by
a comparison of the actual and the warranted real wage rate.
2.Two more complex models
The above model, while providing a useful introduction to the con-
cepts of a warranted labor share and a warranted real wage rate, needs
to be extended considerably before becoming usable for empirical work.
First, we will retain the weak separability assumption for both raw
materials and energy and extend the above model to take account of the
variability in some of the parameters of the production function and
the econometric problems raised by its estimation. Mter developing
this new model, named "model A," we will relax the assumption of weak
separability with respect to energy. The resulting model, which assumes
energy—capital (E—K) complementarity, will be named "model B."— 11—
ModelA
While in the short run all the parameters in equation (2) can be
assumed to be constant, the rate of disembodied productivity change
(X) and the factor weights (cS) and (1 — arelikely to change in the
longer run. The parameteris a "catch a11' parameter that represents
the multitude of factors that explain why output tends to grow faster
than measured inputs; thus, it would be surprising if it did not change
as these factors evolve. This is well recognized in the economic liter-
ature. What is less well recognized, but possibly even more important
in the present context, is thatmay also change over time and affect
the high—employment equilibrium labor share as the production techniques
and the pattern of production become more, or less, labor intensive. In
fact, the evolution of the labor share over the past three decades
suggests that the change in ô may have been sizable. The labor share
remained roughly constant in most major industrial countries througout
the second half of the 1950s and the whole of the 1960s, despite a
doubling or tripling of the ratio of capital to labor. Equation (6)
indicates that such a development is consistent with firm equilibrium
and a constant 5 only if the production function is of the Cobb—Douglas
type (= 0).But ifis zero and 6 is constant, then all of the change
in the labor share experienced in the 1970s and early 1980s should be
viewed as a move away from equilibrium because the equilibrium labor
share would be constant. This does not seem plausible.
Allowing A and 6 to change without using many degrees of freedom
is not an easy task. For A, in particular, it is difficult to impose— 12—
anya priori restriction, so that one cannot avoid a systematic search
for statistically—significant shifts despite the cost in terms of degree
of freedom. For this reason, this parameter will hereafter be written
as At. For S, the change should be fairly gradual, and over the
plausible range of variation one can assume a simple linear function of
time (=+i t).
Even with this restriction on the way 5 can change over time, the
number of parameters in equation (2) is too large for reliable econo-
metric estimation from a single equation. .With periods of observation
limited to twenty to thirty years, there is simply too much multicol—
linearity among the main variables. Frequently, this problem is solved
by jointly estimating the production function and the demand for labor.
In the present context, however, this method has to be modified for two
reasons. First, the demand for labor corresponding to a CES production
function with A and=+ t is:
(9) ln L = 1(in (5 + 5t) —8in y) —1in (wlp)
1+8 0 1 1+8
- 8At+lnY
1+8
It is apparent that there are two trend elements in equation (9)
and that the equation would therefore fail to contribute anything to
the estimation of either or At.
Second, the demand for labor is derived under the assumption that
labor is paid its marginal product. Most studies do take into account
that this assumption is plausible only in the longer run by considering13 —
equation(9) as a long—run demand for labor. The lagged value of ln L is
then added to the right—hand side of equation (9) to reflect the gradual
adjustment of the actual demand for labor to its longer—run equilibrium
value. The problem is that this specification does not differentiate
between the adjustment of L to Y over the cycle, which is often rapid,
and the adjustment of L to w/p, which may be quite slow. 8 Furthermore,
as the cyclical movement in Y is usually the dominant factor, the esti-
mated coefficient of adjustment may exaggerate the rapidity with which
the equilibrium between the real wage rate and the marginal product of
labor is re—established. Thus, imposing equation (9) on the data is
nearly equivalent to imposing the constraint that deviations of the real
wage rate from the equilibrium value corresponding to the amount of
employed labor cannot last more than a few years. Therefore, the change
in the labor share of income experienced in most industrial countries
over the past ten to fifteen years would have to be viewed as a pheno—
menon fully warranted by factors such as changes in production techniques
and in the relative amounts of labor and capital within firms. Such an
assumption would hardly be appropriate in the context of the present
study. 9
The approach adopted here to solve the multicollinearity problem
is to use the share equation (6) rather than the normal demand for labor
equation. The major advantage of equation (6) is that the rate of dis-
embodied productivity change (At) does not enter into it, while the
relative weight of capital (o + i t) does. Thus, this equation is— 14—
apowerful tool to obtain an estimate of 6-jandó1. As it is also
derived under the assumption that labor is paid its marginal product, it
will be assumed to hold only on a cyclically adjusted basis, rather than
in each phase of the cycle. Furthermore, it will only be assumed to have
held during 1955—69 for the European countries and 1955—73 for the United
States and Canada, periods for which there is no reason to expect that
the real wage rate was out of equilibrium. 10 For Japan, equation (6)
will also be assumed to have held during 1955—73, even though the
extremely low labor share during this period suggests that labor was
possibly paid less than its marginal product as a result of an implicit
social consensus that a high profit rate was the best way to rebuild the
capital stock.
After taking account of the considerations discussed above, we
obtain the two functions which comprise model A:
(10) in Y =in'r+Att+ (1—— it)inL +(o+it)inK
—1/2 (i —-t) +t) [in(K/L)]2
(11) S =(1- —t)÷6(+1t) (1-— 1t)in(K/L')
where SL =thetrend—through—peaks value of SL adjusted downward so
that the average of SL is equal to the average of SL
L' =thetrend—through—peaks value of L adjusted downward so that
the average of L' is equal to the average of L.
As just mentioned, equation (ii) is imposed on the data only through
1969 in European countries, and 1973 in the United States, Canada, and
Japan.— 15—
Oncethe parameters of the model have been estimated from equations
(10) and (11), the labor share and the real wage consistent with high—
employment equilibrium can be derived from the modified versions of
equations (7) and (8), namely,
(12) SL =(l—o
—51t)+(ô0 + cS1t)(1 — — S1t)in (K/i:)
(13) in (7)= in(Y/L) + in (L)
=in(SL) inyXt +(o +S1t) in (K/L)
—1/2(1 — — t) (ô0 + '51t) [in (K/L)]2
The most noticeable difference between model A and the simpler model
discussed above is that model A recognizes that a trend increase in the
real wage rate that exceeds the increase in labor productivity at high
employment (YIL) is warranted when there is a reduction in the capital
weight 5, that is when < 0. Such a situation arises when the
pattern of production is shifting toward iess capital—intensive indus—
tries, or when technical innovations are favoring less capital—intensive
production techniques. An evolution in the opposite direction would call
for a growth of the real wage rate that is below the growth of Y/L.
Model B
Weak separability is broadly accepted as a realistic assumption for
raw materials (N), but whether it is a realistic assumption for energy (E)
is open to debate. Berndt and Wood (1979) and others have argued that in
many instances energy and capital must be viewed as complements. Namely,
once entrepreneurs have optimized the energy efficiency of their capital
stock on the basis of the relative price of capital and energy, they are— 16—
largelyunable to change K/L without changing E/L. Under such conditions,





where Y =value—addedcorresponding to L, K and E
K* =acomposite variable reflecting the joint input of capital
and energy.
With E—K complementarity, a marked increase in the relative price
of energy, as in 1973—74 and in 1979—80, would lead entrepreneurs to
increase their demand for labor and decrease their demand for both energy
and capital. Assuming that the functional form for the Y*_levei remains
as assumed in equation (10), the labor share and the real wage rate con-
sistent with high—employment equilibrium would still be determined by
equation (12) and (13), respectively, but after substituting K* for K.
The labor share would now be the share of labor income in Y, and the
real wage rate would be defined in terms of p, the deflator of Y. In
equations (10) and (11), S11 would have to be replaced by S (the
cyclically adjusted share of labor income in y*), while Y would have
to be replaced by Y. An increase in the price of energy leading to a
decline in K*/L would shift the distribution of incomes corresponding to
1* against labor if> 0, and in favor of labor if< 0.
As the practical relevance of E—K complementarity is still in doubt,
we will derive estimates of the warranted real wage rate under each of— 17—
thetwo polar assumptions, namely E—K complementarity (model B) and weak
separability of energy (model A). In model B, the composite variable K*
will be derived by using the linear approximation to the CES functional
form (as for output in equation (2) but without the time trend), namely,
(15) in K* =lnE + (1 —inK —1/2EK1 — [ln(E/K)]2.
3.Measurement issues
The first part of this subsection considers the measurement of
L and K, while the second part considers the measurement of L. The
measurement of the other variables is relatively straightforward and is
described in the Statistical Appendix. The only point that needs to be
noted here is that for France and Italy the national accounting figures
on nominal value added in manufacturing include inventory appreciation——
an element that should not be regarded as either an income to labor or
to fixed capital. For France, we adjusted the figures by using data on
inventory appreciation for the whole nonagricultural economy. For Italy,
we made an even rougher adjustment on the basis of the observed relation
between inflation and inventory appreciation in the other six countries.
For both countries, but especially Italy, the distributional labor and
capital shares are thus subject to possibly sizable errors.
Measurement of L and K
There is no generally accepted way to measure the flows of labor and
capital services. In this paper, we can only provide a brief analysis of
the measurement problems and an explanation of what we did. As in most
other studies, the present analysis uses series on man—hours worked
11—18—
and on the gross capital stock 12 as proxies for the unavailable series
on the flows of labor and capital services. As well known, this proce-
dure requires that an additional variable be inserted in the production
function to pick up cyclical movements in the intensity of use of labor
and capital. 13 The reason is that fluctuations in output corresponding
to unanticipated changes in aggregate demand do not immediately result
in corresponding changes in either the number of man—hours worked or the
level of capital stock. Initially, unexpected variations in demand lead
to changes in the intensity of use of labor and capital, that is, the
amount of services obtained from a given number of man—hours and a given
capital stock varies. Gradually, however, the number of man—hours and
the level of capital stock are changed, and their intensity of use is
brought back to normal. As in Artus (1977), we will assume that the
cyclical variable, to be denoted as D and introduced with a coefficient
of one, is a lagged function of the actual rate of change of output, net
of the expected long—run rate of change (ji).Morespecifically, it
will be assumed that:
(16) in D =p[in (/-i) —
wherethe notation (——)L indicates a geometrically distributed lag
operator. The expected long—run rate of change of output will be
approximated by a ten—year lagged moving average of in (Y/Y_1).
Even with D in the production function, there are still various
measurement problems that must be considered. For L, the main problem
is that the available data on man—hours do not reflect the level of— 19—
educationand technical expertise of the work force. In the present
context, however, It is likely that the problem is not too severe because
those changes occur only gradually. Even when demographic and economic
developments lead to a marked increase in the growth of the work force
and a decline in its mean age, there is no strong reason to assume that
the average level of education and technical expertise is affected.
While new entries in the labor force tend to be younger and better edu-
cated, they also have less on—the—job experience.14 Thus, the measure-
ment error in L can be assumed to be highly collinear with a simple time
trend. It could lead to a bias in the econometric estimates of the
trend coefficients (Xt and but the estimates of the other
coefficients would be unaffected. Even more importantly, the estimates
of Sj and w/p would also be unaffected.
For K, the remaining problems are more severe. All of them result
from the fact that currently the only practical method to obtain an esti-
mate of the gross capital stock is the rather mechanical one of cumu-
lating past investment flows, net of discards. This method, if applied
carelessly, may lead to a growing measurement error which, this time,
would not necessarily be collinear with the trend rates already in the
model. Three considerations are especially important.
First, the cumulation of real investment flows does not take proper
account of the fact that a piece of machinery bought in year t + 1
embodies more technical knowledge and is thus more efficient than one
bought in year t. The reason is that the price series used to deflate— 20—
theinvestment flows tend to exaggerate the amount of inflation because
the price increases that reflect the efficiency increases are not properly
separated from the prices increases reflecting inflation. When there is
a decline in the growth of investment, as after 1973, it is likely that
this will be followed by a temporary decline in the growth of the average
efficiency of the capital stock because of the temporary reduction in the
proportion of relatively new equipment in the total stock of equipment.
Such a decline in the growth of the average efficiency of the capital
stock will not be reflected in the capital stock series obtained by cumu-
lating investment flows. To reduce this type of measurement error, the
capital stock series used in this study were adjusted by an efficiency
scalar that is function of the mean age of the capital stock. A detailed
description of how this adjustment was carried out can be found in the
Statistical Appendix.
Second, voluntarily or as a result of government regulation, firms
purchase equipment that produces products that are omitted from the mea-
sured GNP. In particular, firms purchase equipment to reduce environ-
mental pollution. As long as the proportion of such investment in total
investment is constant, the problem is not severe because the rate of
growth of the "productive" capital stock is unaffected. However, in the
United States, Canada, and Japan, new government regulations led to an
upward shift of that proportion in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The
data published by the U.S. Department of Commerce indicate that the
proportion of pollution abatement investment in total U.S. investment— 21—
inmanufacturing rose from about 1 per cent in the mid—1960s to about
8 percent in the mid—1970s, then declined gradually to around 5 percent
in the late 1970s and early 1980s. 15 A series for expenditure on
pollution abatement was derived from these data, and it was subtracted
from the U.S. investment series to get a measure of "productive" invest-
ment. No precise data are available for Canada and Japan, but, as a
rough adjustment for the jump in pollution abatement expenditures, the
investment figures for these two countries were reduced by 5 percent
from 1969 onwards. If anything, this adjustment is probably on the low
side.
Third, the major unanticipated structural changes that took place
in the aftermath of the 1973—74 and 1979—80 oil price increases are
likely to have caused the premature obsolescence of part of the capital
stock. Capital is heterogeneous and specialized. Sudden changes in the
structure of demand faced by firms and the relative costs of using speci-
fic energy—intensive equipment leave some equipment without any economic
value even though it may be relatively new. Even in less extreme cases,
there may be an incentive for firms to speed up the replacement of some
equipment by more energy—efficient equipment. Of course, a one—time loss
of equipment does not lead to a permanent decline in the capital stock
because normal obsolescence would, in any case, eventually lead to the
discard of this equipment. Unless premature obsolescence is taken into
account, however, the capital stock can be seriously overestimated in the
first few years that follow the demand or supply shock.- 22-
Theextent of this phenomenon in the aftermath of the 1973—74 and
1979-80 oil price increases is still an unsettled issue. Economists
such as Baily (1981) take the large decline in the market value of cor-
porations relative to the replacement cost of tangible assets, Tobin's q,
as an indication that a large part of the capital stock (perhaps 20 per-
cent) was prematurely discarded just after the first wave of oil price
increases, and presumably as much after the second wave. Others, such as
Bosworth (1982), compare the historical cost valuation of gross stocks
derived from surveys conducted by the U.S. Bureau of the Census with the
results derived from the perpetual—inventory valuation method with a
fixed discard pattern, and conclude that only a small part of the capital
stock (perhaps 2—3 percent) was prematurely discarded. Both methods have
major weaknesses. Tobin's q is likely to reflect many factors that have
little if anything to do with the effective size of the gross capital
stock and the flow of services that can be derived from it. As to the
historical cost valuation of gross stocks derived from surveys, it is
notoriously unreliable. The estimates of gross capital stock used in the
present study assume that 10 percent of the existing capital stock was
prematurely retired during 1974—76, and that the same proportion was pre-
maturely retired during 1980—82. As this estimate is highly tentative,
a sensitivity analysis was carried out with a 5 percent and a 15 percent
estimate.
Measurement of L
To obtain an estimate of the high—employment labor input in manufac-
turing (L) that is consistent with the definition of high employment for— 23—
thewhole economy, we use the method developed in Artus and Turner (1978).
This method is based on the estimation of the following simple equation
relating the actual labor input in manufacturing (L) to a nonlinear time
trend and to the unemployment rate in the whole economy (U):
(17) ln(L) =a0+ a1 t+ a2t2+ a3t3—
a4U
At cyclical peaks, the value of L is calculated as
(18) ln(1) =ln(L)+a4(U —iS)
whereU is the unemployment rate corresponding to a situation of high
employment in the whole economy, and a4 is the estimated value of a4.
In between peaks, the value of L is calculated by fitting log—linear
trends between the successive peak values of L obtained from equation (18).
After the last cyclical peak, the assumed growth rate of L is an extrapo—
lation of the estimated rate between the last two observed cyclical peaks.
The extrapolated figures are adjusted when necessary for changes in
demographic factors and in the length of the normal work week.
The most difficult task is to estimate the high—employment rate U,
that is, the rate where labor shortages become widespread because the
residual unemployment is due to the normal turnover in the labor market
and to regional and skill mismatches between labor supply and demand.
In the present study, the estimate of U is derived from the "Beveridge
Curve," a graphical presentation of the inverse relationship between
unemployment and vacancies. 16 More specifically, U is defined as the
unemployment rate where the curve becomes nearly vertical, with large
increases in vacancies associated with only small reductions in the- 24—
unemploymentrate. Allowance is made for shifts in the curve and there—
f ore shifts in U that reflect changes in the amount of frictional and
mismatch unemployment. Over the past decade, however, some of the coun-
tries considered here experienced few, if any, years where the number of
vacancies was high, so that it is difficult to draw complete Beveridge
Curves for this period. In such cases, we examine whether the unemploy-
ment rates corresponding to relatively low numbers of vacancies have
changed from the 1960s to the l970s and early l980s, and we assumethat
the vertical part of the curve has shifted by the same amount as the part
corresponding to relatively low numbers of vacancies. For Italy,where
there is no data on vacancies, U was derived by using a more ad hoc
method (see the Statistical Appendix).
Table 2 presents the main results related to the estimation of L.
A striking result is the large value of a for Japan, which reflects
the effect of labor—sharing arrangements and the apparent greater ease
with which the service sector absorbs the increase in labor force during
periods of slow growth in the manufacturing sector. Another striking
result is the marked reduction in the growth rate ofin Japan and in
European countries during the past decade and a half. Thisreduction
reflects a marked increase in the value of U during this period (see the
Statistical Appendix), as well as an acceleration of the historical trend
in the allocation of the labor force in favor of the service sector, pos-
sibly caused by the rapid growth of government services, a changein com-






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































special factors such as North Sea oil in the United Kingdom. Despite
the reduction in the growth rate of L, we find that at the cyclical peak
in 1979—80 there were still sizable gaps between L and L in Japan, France,
the Federal Republic of Germany, and Italy. By contrast, the gaps were
fairly small in the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom because
in these countries the residual unemployment, even though very high,
seemed to correspond to frictional and mismatch unemployment. By 1982,
the gaps were large in all seven countries.
These estimates of L are of course subject to a large margin of
error. In particular, they assume that: (1) at each cyclical peak, the
relation between aggregate unemployment (in excess of U) and man—hours
worked in manufacturing is the same; (2) the change in the distribution
of employment among sectors between two cyclical peaks is due to long—
run changes in comparative advantage and in the pattern of demand, rather
than real wage problems in manufacturing; (3) the rate of change of U
and the rate of change in the distribution of employment among sectors
between the last two cyclical peaks, 1973—74 and 1979—80, can be extra-
polated to the early 1980s. On balance, it is much more likely that
these assumptions lead to an underestimation, rather than an overesti-
mation, of L during the late 197Os and early 1980s, at least in Japan
and in European countries. Mainly, one cannot but wonder whether the
marked shift in the distribution of employment toward the service sector,
especially government services, that took place in Japan and in European
countries between 1973—74 and 1979—80 was really warranted by long—run— 27—
growthconsiderations. In part, this shift may itself be the result of
an excessive real wage rate in manufacturing. Some of the persons that
could not get a job in this sector because labor contracts prevented
entrepreneurs from offering them a wage corresponding to their marginal
product were probably recruited in the government sector to limit the
rise in unemployment, or absorbed by the private service sector in occu-
pations involving very low marginal product and very low real wages. In
addition, it may be unduly pessimistic to extrapolate into the early
1980s the rapid rise in U observed between 1973—74 and 1979—80. In fact,
the evidence does not suggest a further shift of the Beveridge Curve in
the early 1980s, except possibly in France and the United Kingdom.
III. Empirical Results
Parameters of models A and B were estimated for the seven largest
industrial countries by using nonlinear least—squares methods and annual
observations. For the production function, the observation sample is
1961—82 for the Federal Republic of Germany and 1955—82 for the other six
countries. 17 For the share function, the observation sample is 1961—69
for the Federal Republic of Germany; 1955—73 for the United States,
Canada, and Japan; and 1955—69 for France, Italy, and the United King-
dom. 18 In the estimation, the share functions for the United States,
Canada, France, and Italy had to be adjusted for first—order autocor—
relation by using the Cochrane—Orcutt method, and a systematic search
was made for significant changes in the value of the rate of disembodied
productivity growth (At). The estimated values of the parameters were
then used to calculate the warranted labor shares and real wage rates.— 28—
1.Parameter estimates
The parameter estimates for model A are presented in Table 3. We
find that the rate of disembodied productivity growth increased during
the 1960s and then fell back during the l970s and early 1980s. The only
exception is the Federal Republic of Germany, where the rate of dis—
embodied productivity growth was constant throughout the period 1961—82.
An examination of the regression residuals for 1981 and 1982 suggests
that productivity growth may have picked up again in the United Kingdom
in recent years, but it is still too early to say. These results cor-
roborate the findings of Denison (1982), Bosworth (1982), and others,
that a significant part of the decline in the growth of labor produc-
tivity during the last decade is not accounted for by the declinein the
rate of capital accumulation. This is true even when, as in the present
study, the rate of capital accumulation is adjusted downward totake
account of the rise in pollution abatement investment and premature
obsolescence. 19
Aside from the evolution of X over time, it is striking how much X
varies across countries and how stable the cross—country differences are.
For the past three decades, X has tended to be about 3 percentage points
higher in Japan and 2 percentage points higher in Franceand Italy than in
the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom. The Federal Republic
of Germany, by avoiding a decline in X, has moved from the low group
during the l960s and early 1970s to the middle group duringthe last ten
years. These large and persistent differenceshave obvious implications— 29—
Table3. Estimates of the Parameters of Model A 1/
United United
Country States 2/ Canada 2/ Japan France 2/ GermanyItaly 2/ Kingdom
ln y —0.023 —0.003 —0.019—0.034 0.036 0.016 0.011
(0.003) (0.002)(0.006) (0.007)(0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
A 3/ 1955—60 1955—601955—66 1955—64 1955—601955—60 —
1.44 1.81 4.87 5/ 4.02 3.11 1.08
(0.24) (0.20) (0.15)(0.09) (0.26) (0.30)
1961—73 1961—731967—70 1965—701961—82 1961—731961—73
2.74 3.63 6.73 5.33 3.05 4.69 3.05
(0.06) (0.05) (0.29) (0.22) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07)
1974—82 1974—821971—82 1971—82 1974—82 1974—82
0.89 1.15 3.68 2.29 2.85 1.04
(0.14) (0.13) (0.21) (0.17) (0.15) (0.21)
o4/ 26.2 33.1 54.8 39.5 31.8 37.7 27.9
(0.3) (0.2) (0.4) (0.2) (0.4) (0.2) (0.2)
0.56 0.14 0.45 6/ 0.66 0.54 —0.14 0.62
(0.11) (0.04) (0.03) (0.09) (0.04) (0.05) (0.26)
8 1.014 0.189 0.225 0.569 0.406 0.306 0.789
(0.163) (0.049)(0.012) (0.095)(0.020) (0.036)(0.246)
p 0.426 0.469 0.704 0.524 0.328 0.487 0.373
(0.028) (0.037)(0.026) (0.081)(0.069) (0.050) (0.072)
Goodness—of—fit statistics
Production function
SE 7/ 1.69 1.49 1.81 1.92 3.99 2.54 2.33
Share function
SE 7/ 0.59 0.17 0.23 0.26 0.12 0.17 0.28
1/ Parentheses enclose asymptotic standard errors.
2/ For these countries, the share function had to be adjusted for first—
order autocorrelation. The estimates of Rho are: United States, 0.78 (0.09);
Canada, 0.50 (0.15); France, 0.60 (0.19); and Italy, 0.82 (0.06).
3/ The trend rates of growth of disembodied productivity are in percent
per year.
4/ The weights of capital services are indicated in percent. The trend
rates of change in these weights are in percentage point per year.
5/ The estimate of 4.87 (0.15) is for the 1955—58 and 1962—66 periods.
For 1959—61, the estimate is 9.39 (0.42).
6/ The estimate of 0.45 (0.03) is for the 1955—70 period. For 1971—82,
the estimate is —0.08 (0.07).
7/ SE denotes the standard error of estimate of the estimated equation.
Th standard error is in percent for the production function and in per-
centage points for the share function. The R2 is not given as it conveys
little information in the present case.— 30—
notonly for the growth of the real wage rate, but alsofor employment
and capital formation. During the last ten years, manufacturing produc-
tion had to grow by more than 4 percent per year in Japanand more than
2—3 percent per year in France, the Federal Republic of Germany,and
Italy to lead to an increase in the demand for laborand capital services
in manufacturing. In the United States, Canada, and theUnited Kingdom,
the same result could be achieved with an increase in productionof only
slightly more than 1 percent.
We find that in most countries the weight on the capitalstock (5)
is increasing over time, that is, is positive. Again this is not a
surprising result; the tendency for a gradual increasein the capital
intensity of production techniques has been inevidence for a very long
time. For Japan, however, the data suggest that the tendencyfor an
increase in was interrupted during 1971—82. A possible reasonfor
this development is that Japan experienced a marked changein its struc-
ture of production during this period as a resultof a deliberate policy
to move away from industries involving a highlevel of raw materials and
energy imports. Many of these industries,such as the steel industry,
were also capital intensive. In addition, it canbe noted that the
value ofwas already very high during the second halfof the 1950s and
during the 1960s; much higher than in otherindustrial countries.
The parameteris positive for all countries; the corresponding
elasticity of substitution between labor and capital (ri,ii= 1/(1+ ))
isthus lower than one. For most countries, r is between0.5 and 0.8, a31 —
resultwhich matches the finding of other studies such as Griffins and
Gregory (1976) and Pindyck (1979). The important implication of this
result is that a rise in the capital/labor ratio tends to increase the
equilibrium labor share of incomes. (See equation (12).) In periods
where the capital/labor ratio rises rapidly, this effect may dominate
the effect of the gradual rise in the weight on the capital stock, and
the equilibrium labor share may increase. In other periods, the weight
effect may dominate and the equilibrium labor share may decrease.
The estimates of the parameter p are between 0.4 to 0.5 for most
countries. This means that a sudden decline in the rate of growth of
output of 10 percentage points is normally accompanied by a decline in
the intensity of use of labor and capital resources within firms cor-
responding to a decline in total factor productivity of 4 to 5 percent.
Then, the intensity of use of labor and capital is gradually brought
back to normal as firms reduce their work force and their capital stock
(see equation (16)). In the second year, assuming no further shock, the
apparent total factor productivity is only 1 1/2 to 2 1/2 percent below
what it would have been without the output decline. In Japan, the adjust—
ment is significantly slower; factor productivity is cut by 7 percent the
first year and it takes four years for the reduction in productivity to
become less than 2 percent.
Practically all the parameter estimates have low asymptotic standard
errors. However, this result should not be viewed as an indication that
the estimates are highly precise and reliable. First, from a statistical— 32—
standpoint,we are working with fairly small samples so that the asympto—
tic standar errors have very limited relevance. Unfortunately, the small
sample properties of estimates for parameters in these non—linear models
are unknown. Second, slight changes in the choice of the subperiods for
the A parameters often lead to significant changes in the estimates
of the cS andparameters. The problem is particularly severe for the
United Kingdom, where there is a high positive covariance between the
estimates of andbecause during the 1955—69 period SL is nearly
constant and the ratio K/L is growing at a stable rate. Third, the esti-
mates for Sç, ,and are for all practical purposes determined by
the share function. When both equations are estimated separately, the
estimates of Sij, 'Si, and derived from the share function are prac-
tically identical to the estimates presented in Table 3,20 while the
estimates derived from the production function have often implausible
values and high standard errors. Therefore, the estimates presented in
Table 3 must be viewed as highly dependent on the assumption that during
the estimation period S was in fact the equilibrium labor share cor-
responding to the cyclically adjusted level of employment.
The above results are based on the assumptions that during 1974—76,
and then again during 1980—82, 10 percent of the existing capital stock
was prematurely retired. When the assumption was changed from 10 to 15
percent (to 5 percent), the estimated values of X for the l970s and
early 1980s were raised (lowered), but only by 0.1 to 0.2. All the other
estimates remained roughly unchanged.— 33—
Thefirst step in the estimation of model B is the estimation of3EK
and E. parameters that are needed to calculate the flow ofservices
corresponding to the K* input (see equation (15)). In the present study,
the parameter 5E is assumed equal to the share ofenergy cost in the
total of energy and capital costs in 1972, the lastyear before the first
wave of oil price increases. To obtain an estimate of8EK' we have
used the following equation:
(19) SE 1 (S + 8EK (S (1 —5)ln(K/E)
which is the equivalent of equation (6) for thecompetitive allocation of
income between capital and energy. Focusing on the 1972—82period of
doubling real energy prices, we have solved equation (19) for the value
of 13EK corresponding to the observed changes inSE and ln(K/E).21 The
results in Table 4 indicate that the value ofEK is in the order of 2
to 3, which corresponds to a relatively small elasticity ofsubstitution
of 0.25 to 0.35. 22 For purposes of the presentstudy, we have
taken a value of EK of 2.5 for all seven countries. As thisestimate
is subject to a large margin of error, exp?riments withestimates ranging
from 1.5 to 3.5 were carried out with little effecton the estimates of
the other parameters of model B, or the estimates of theequilibrium
labor shares and real wage rates.
The estimated values of the other parameters of model Bare presented
in Table 5. The results are similar to those obtained for modelA with
two exceptions. First, as could be expected, the estimated value of




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table5. Estimates of the Parameters of Model B 1/
United United
Country States 2/ Canada 2/ Japan France 2/ GermanyItaly 2/ Kingdom
in y —0.022 —0.026 —0.006—0.029 0.038 0.016 0.013
(0.003) (0.002)(0.008) (0.006)(0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
1955—601955—601955—66 1955—64 1955—601955—60
1.45 1.89 4.22 5/ 3.78 2.39 0.49
(0.23) (0.18) (0.19) (0.08) (0.27) (0.31)
1961—73 1961—731967—70 1965—701961—82 1961—731961—73
2.57' 3.36 5.45 4.99 2.80 4.37 2.80
(0.06) (0.05) (0.37) (0.21) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07)
1974—82 1974—821971—82 1971—82 1974—82 1974—82
0.90 1.05 4.41 2.27 2.57 1.46
(0.14) (0.12) (0.26) (0.17) (0.16) (0.22)
o4/ 29.2 37.0 59.2 42.9 36,2 42.9 32.6
(0.4) (0.3) (0.4) (0.8) (0.3) (0.2) (0.2)
4/ 0.53 0.15 0.50 6/ 0.71 0.47 —0.14 0.22 —
(0.14) (0.05) (0.03) (0.13) (0.03) (0.05) (0.29)
0.813 0.182 0.254 0.587 0.372 0.258 0.460
(0.172) (0.050)(0.014) (0.118)(0.016) (0.037)(0.310)
p 0.412 0.447 0.772 0.458 0.349 0.492 0.325
(0.028) (0.034)(0.033) (0.073)(0.072) (0.052)(0.077)
Goodness—of—fit statistics
Production function
SE 7/ 1.64 1.32 2.44 1.73 4.00 2.56 2.43
Share function
SE 7/ 0.72 0.13 0.24 0.26 0.11 0.33 0.31
1/ Parentheses enclose asymptotic standard errors.
2/ For these countries, the share function had to be adjusted for first—
order autocorrelation. The estimates of Rho are: United States, 0.81 (0.08);
Canada, 0.81 (0.09); France, 0.60 (0.21); and Italy, 0.83 (0.05).
3/ The trend rates of growth of total disembodied factor productivity
are indicated in percent per year.
4/ The weights of capital services are indicated in percent. The trend
rates of change in these weights are in percentage point per year.
5/ The estimate of 4.22 (0.19) is for the 1955—58 and 1962—66 periods.
For 1959—61, the estimate is 7.76 (0.52).
6/ The estimate of 0.50 (0.03) is for the 1955—70 period. For 1971—82,
the estimate is —0.12 (0.07).
7/ SE denotes the standard error of estimate of the estimated equation.
The standard error is in percent for the production function and in per-
centage points for the share function, The R2 is not given as it conveys
little information in the present case.— 36—
theshare of capital and energy cost in the total value added corre-
sponding to capital, energy, and labor in the mid—1950s. Second, the
reduction in the value of X from the l960s to the l970s and early 1980s
is now smaller, but generally not by much. Thus, even when the reduction
in energy use achieved during the past ten years is explicitly taken
into account as it is in model B, there is still a sizable unexplained
reduction in the rate of growth of disembodied productivity.
2. Warranted Labor shares and real wage rates
A comparison of the normalized and the warranted labor shares derived
from model A corroborates the disequilibrium real wage rate hypothesis
(see Chart 1). By the early 1980's, the normalized share is well above
the warranted share in all seven countries except Canada. The gap
between the normalized and the warranted shares is particularly large
in France, the Federal Republic of Germany, and in the United Kingdom,
where it reaches about ten percentage points. The gap is smaller, but
still about five percentage points, in the United States, Japan, and
Italy.
The date at which this gap appears differs among countries. In
France and Italy, the normalized share starts to move above the warranted
share in the late 1960s and early l970s, and the move accelerates with
the first wave of oil price increases in 1973—74. During the second
half of the l970s, the gap stabilizes in France and declines in Italy.
In both countries, the second wave of oil price increases in 1979—80 is
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becomessizable only with the second wave of oil price increases. In
Japan, the Federal Republic of Germany, and the United Kingdom, the gap
emerges with the first wave of oil price increases, stabilizes or even
starts to contract, then increases again with the second wave. For
Japan, the growth of the gap from 1978 to 1982 reflects an average
increase in the nominal wage rate of close to 7 percent per annum coupled
with an average decrease in the value added deflator of 0.5 percent.
With an estimated growth rate of labor productivity at high employment
(YIL) of 5 percent, the Japanese case illustrates how adjustment can
be extremely successful in nominal terms (in the sense of eliminating
inflation), without being fully successful in real terms.
These results are broadly similar to those derived by looking at
the deviations of the actual labor shares from their historical averages
during, say, 1955—69 as measures of the disequilibrium in income distri-
bution. (See Chart 1.) The reason is twofold. First, the evolution of
the normalized shares is not all that different from the evolution of
the actual shares. Differences have a tendency to appear during periods
of recession such as 1974—75 and 1982, when the actual shares often move
above the normalized shares because the reductions in the amounts of
employed labor lag the reductions in production. However, except in
Japan, the lag is relatively small so that these differences are quickly
resorbed. Moreover, the estimated elasticities of substitution between
labor and capital are not very different from one so that even in recent
years it does not matter too much if we consider the actual labor share,— 38—
whichcorresponds to K!L, rather than the normalized share, which corre-
sponds to K/L. 23 Second, the estimates of the warranted shares for the
1970s and early 1980s are rather similar to the estimates of the war-
ranted shares for 1955—69, which on average are themselves similar to
the actual shares during 1955—69. Again the main reason is that the
estimated elasticities of substitution are not very different from one,
so that the warranted shares remain relatively stable despite sizable
changes in the rates of increase of KIL.
Even though the new results are broadly similar to those derived
from simple comparisons of actual shares, the differences between the
two sets of results are far from negligible, suggesting that at times
comparisons of actual shares are misleading. For example, for the
United Kingdom and, especially, for Italy the warranted labor share is
estimated to be higher during the l970s and early 1980s than during
1955—59, so that a simple comparison of actual shares exaggerates the
magnitude of the disequilibrium in recent years. For Japan, the com-
parison of actual shares is even more misleading. The actual labor
share jumps up in the first half of the l970s, mainly in 1974—75, and
then stabilizes, suggesting that Japan adjusted much better to the second
wave of oil price rises than to the first. What the new results show,
however, is that the jump in the labor share that took place in the first
half of the l970s was not a severe problem. First, it started from a
position where the actual share was significantly below the warranted
share. Second, it was largely related to the presence of temporary labor— 39—
hoarding,as evidenced by the much smaller increase in thenormalized
share. And third, there was a gradual increase in the warrantedshare
during that period because of a rapid increase in K/L. (SeeTables 1 and
2.) By contrast, during the late 1970s and early 1980s, labor hoarding
was slowly reduced and the stability of the actual sharehides a further
rise in the normalized share. Moreover, the warranted share stopped
rising because the growth of K/L decelerated sharply.
The normalized and the warranted labor shares derived from model B
are depicted in Chart 2. All the shares are now in percentof the total
of labor, capital, and energy costs, rather than only the total of labor
and capital costs. For the United States, Canada, and Italy, the E—K
complementarity hypothesis leads to results that differ fromthose
derived from the traditional production model. Focussing on the l980s,
the normalized share is now found to be roughly equal to the warranted
share in the United States and Italy, and actually smaller than the
warranted share in Canada. For the other four countries, on the other
hand, the estimates of the gaps between the normalized andthe warranted
shares remain roughly unchanged.
To understand why the results of model B differ from those ofmodel
A, one must consider the effects of E—K complementarity onboth the
warranted labor shares and the normalized labor shares. The warranted
shares tend to rise less, or decline more, in model B than inmodel A
during the past ten years because, with the decline in the useof energy



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































MODEL B: ACTUAL (SL), NORMALIZED (SL) AND
WARRANTED (SL) LABOR SHARES1























1Laborshares of total cost of capital, labor, and energy imputs (i.e. labor shares of the sum of value added
at factor cost, net of inventory appreciation, and energy cost).
19551960 1965197019751980- 41-
K*ILand K/L are larger for the United States, France, and the United
Kingdom than for the other four countries, the warranted shares of the
former countries are more affected than those of the latter countries.
However, these differences are small because the coefficients of K*/L
and K/L for the former countries are still relatively small. Turning
to the normalized shares, they also tend to rise less, or decline more,
in model B than in model A during the past ten years because of the
increase in the cost of energy used (included in Y*p* but not in Y p).
But in this case there are relatively large differences among countries.
The share of the cost of energy in the total cost of production rose
significantly more in the United States, Canada, Japan, and Italy, than
in the other three countries during the past ten years (see last column
of Table 6). Furthermore, as the effect of a given rise in the share of
energy costs on the normalized labor share is proportionate to the rela-
tive size of labor and capital costs, the resulting reduction in the
normalized labor share was much larger in the United States, Canada,
and Italy, than in Japan.
Chart 3 depicts the wage gaps corresponding to the two models. As
noted above, these gaps are equal to the corresponding gaps between the
normalized and the warranted labor shares scaled by the ratios of value
added (inclusive of energy costs for model B) over warranted labor costs
under conditions of high employment. For France, Japan, the Federal
Republic of Germany, and the United Kingdom, the two models yield a wage
gap of 12 to 16 percent for the early 1980s. For the United States and— 42—
Italy,model A gives a gap in the order of 5 percent, while model B gives
no significant gap. For Canada, model A suggests no gap, while model B
suggests that the real wage rate is, if anything, on the low side.
A sensitivity analysis indicates that the wage gaps are relatively
robust to variations in the estimates of the gross capital stocks and the
high—employment labor inputs. For example, we recalculated the wage gaps
for 1982 from model B after reducing our estimates of the gross capital
stock by 10 percent. This change decreased the warranted real wage rate
and increased the wage gap to 16 to 18 percent in Japan, France, the
Federal Republic of Germany, and the United Kingdom; to 3 to 5 percent
in the United States and Italy; and to about zero percent in Canada.
When we recalculated the wage gaps after raising our estimates of the
high—employment labor input by 10 percent, rather than reducing capital
by 10 percent, the estimates of the wage gaps were increased by afurther
2 to 3 percentage points.
Finally, we recalculated the wage gaps after reducing our estimates
of the high—employment labor input for 1982 to the level of the actual
labor input. Even under this extreme——and quite unrealistic——assumption
that all the unemployment observed in 1982 was due to regional and skill
mismatches between labor supply and demand, we still found a wage gap of
5 to 8 percent in France, Japan, and the Federal Republic of Germany, and
about 3 percent in the United Kingdom. This finding is worrisome because
it implies that in the four countries concerned the level of the real
wage rate may be an obstacle not only to a return to high employment,but
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'A positive number indicates that the tual real wage rate (measured in terms of the relevant value-added deflator) eaceeds the
real wage rate that is consliteni with the choaen highecnp)oyrnent norm.- 43-
Ananalysis of the factors that led to the emergence of these gaps
is outside the scope of the present study, but the evolution of the rates
of growth of warranted real wage rates provides an insight into this
question. Table 7 gives the estimates corresponding tomodel B, both in
terms of the deflator of output, p, and in terms of consumer prices, Pc
The estimates corresponding to model A would be similar, except that for
the United States, Canada, and Italy, the post—1973 rate of growth would
be somewhat lower. The most noticeable result is the extremely sharp
deceleration in the rate of growth of the warranted real wage rate in
terms of p* in all seven countries after 1972. This deceleration was
attributable partly to a decline in the growth of disembodied produc-
tivity (A), and partly to a decline in the growth of theratio of
the composite capital—energy input to the labor input (K*/L). The
deceleration attributable to this ratio was especially marked during
the period 1979—82, when energy use fell sharply and investment was
depressed. Generally, the change in the terms of trade between manu-
factures and consumer goods (p*/pC) was positive during 1973—78 and
negative during 1979—82; thus, it reduced the decelerationof the
growth of the warranted real wage rate in terms of consumer pricesat
first, then increased it. During 1979—82, the rate of growthof the
warranted real wage rate in terms of consumer prices was negative in
the United States, Japan, and the United Kingdom. In the other four
countries, it was only 1 to 2 percent.— 44—
Table 7. Sources of Growth in Warranted Real Wage Rates in Manufacturing (Model B) 1/
(Percentage change in warranted rate attributableto each source)
1956—691970—72 1973—781979—821956—691970—72 1973—781979—82
United States
2.2 2.6 1.2 0.9
0.9 1.6 1.0 0.2
—0.7 —0.7 —0.7 —0.7
2.5 3.6 1.6 0.5
—0.5 —1.2 0.1 —1.8
2.0 2.4 1.7 —1,3
2.0 1.6 1.3 0.0
Japan
5.2 4.7 4.4 4.4
6.2 9.7 3.4 —1.0
—1.2 —0.1 0.2 0.2
10.4 14.8 8.1 3.5
—3.2 —3.5 —4.9 —3.8
6.9 10.8 2.8 —0.4
6.7 10.4 3.4 2.1
Germany
Canada
2.8 3.4 1.4 1.1
1.7 2.0 1.2 0.1
—0.3 —0.3 —0.3 —0.3
4.2 5.2 2.3 0.9
—1.6 —0.4 1.0 —0.1
2.5 4.8 3.3 0.8
2.8 3.8 2.8 0.0
France
4.2 3.2 2.3 2.3
2.6 4.4 4.0 1.2
—1.2 —1.2 —1.2 —1.2
5.4 6.3 5.1 2.3
—1.2 —1.8 —0.4 —0.5
4.3 4.4 4.7 1.8


















































3.6 4.4 2.8 2.6
2.8 2.6 1.9 —0.3
0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
6.6 7.1 5.0 2.5
—1.4 1.5 1.7 —0.3
5.1 8.7 6.8 2.2






























1/Notation: A, rateof disembodied productivity change; K*IL, ratioof the E —K co-
bined input to labor; d1, rate of increase in the weight of capital; w/p', warranted real
wage rate in terms of the deflator of value added corresponding tc labor, capital, and
energy; p*/pc, ratio between the deflator of value added and consumer prices; war-
ranted real wage rate in terms of consumer prices; and wipe, actual real wage rate in
terms of consumer prices.
2 Average rate of growth during 1962—69.— 45—
Inall seven countries, except the United Kingdom, the adjustment
to the deceleration in the growth of the warranted real wage rate in
terms of consumer prices was considerable, with the rate of growth of
the actual real wage rate declining by 2 percentage points or more from
1956—69 to 1979-82. 24 Thus, it would be an exaggeration to say that
the rate of growth of the real wage rate was rigid. In fact, there was a
great deal of flexibility, but not always enough. The two most obvious
cases where flexibility fell short from what was needed in recent years
were Japan and the United Kingdom, where the actual real wage rate in
terms of consumer prices has kept growing at a 2 to 3 percent rate,
instead of declining in line with the warranted rate.
For France and the Federal Republic of Germany, the other two coun-
tries where there is currently a large gap, it is really in the early and
mid—1970s that the gap emerged, at a time when the rate of growth of the
warranted real wage rate was still relatively high. But, in recent
years, the growth of the actual real wage rate was nearly keptin line
with the low growth of the warranted rate. These findings suggest that
in these two countries the problem is not so much a systematic tendency
for inertia in the adjustment of real wages to supply shocks as argued
by Branson and Rotemberg (1980), Sachs (1979, 1983), and others, as a
failure to reverse the unwarranted increases in real wages of the early
and mid—1970s. Increases that, at least for France, had as much to do
with the wage explosion of the early 1970s as with the supply shocks of
the mid—1970s.— 46—
IV.ConcludingRemarks
We began this study by noting that the marked increase in the share
of labor costs in value added that took place during the 1970s and early
1980s in the manufacturing sector of most major industrial countries
does not necessarily imply that the real wage rate is now too high and
is causing unemployment. The increase could be warranted by long—run
changes in production techniques, in the price of energy, and in the
relative availability of labor and capital. After taking into account
these considerations, we conclude that, as far as the manufacturing
sector is concerned, there are indeed strong reasons to believe that in
France, the Federal Republic of Germany, and the United Kingdom, the
real wage rate is too high, in the sense of being incompatible with high
employment. In particular, in these three countries, we did not find any
evidence that a large part of the actual increase in the share of labor
costs in value added was warranted by long—run changes in production
techniques, in the price of energy, or in the relative availability of
labor and capital. On the other hand, for Canada and the United States,
the results indicate that there is no real wage problem. For Japan and
Italy, the conclusions have to be more nuanced. For Japan, the results
indicate that the large increases in the share of labor costs in value
added is not fully warranted by concomitant changes in the factors con-
sidered in the study. At the same time, the initial labor share was so
small that this increase may be less of a problem than in France, the
Federal Republic of Germany, and the United Kingdom. For Italy, the— 47—
resultssuggest that there is no real wage problem, but poor data
prevent a firm conclusion in this regard. These findings are derived
from an analysis in which the capital stock and the exchange rate are
assumed to be exogenous. Moreover, they apply only to the manufacturing
sector as a whole; there can obviously be a real wage problem in specific
industries even when the average real wage for the manufacturing sector
is not unduly high. 25
While derived from a model that is more elaborate than previous
ones, the estimates of the warranted real wage rates on whichthese con-
clusions are based must still be regarded as tentative for at least
three reasons. First, it is difficult to measure the actual flows of
labor and capital services and, a fortiori, the high—employment labor
supply in manufaturing. The sensitivity analysis carried out in the
present study indicates that the order of magnitude of the warranted real
wage rate is relatively robust to plausible variations in thevalues
taken by these variables; nevertheless, the resulting uncertainty is far
from negligible. To reduce this uncertainty would require an extension
of the study to other sectors of the economy so as to estimate simul-
taneously the warranted allocation of labor among the various sectors
and the warranted real wage rates in all sectors. This extension would
be especially useful for countries such as the United Kingdom which have
recently experienced a major break in the historical pattern of relative
growth of their manufacturing and nonmanufacturing sectors. Reducing
uncertainty would also require better data on the flow of capital— 48—
services.The main problem in this context is the lack of reliable
information on the extent of premature obsolescence resulting from
the two waves of oil price increases.
Second, the estimates suffer from a number of country—specific
problems. For Italy, and to a lesser extent France, the data on nominal
value added in manufacturing are somewhat unreliable because of the lack
of adequate information on inventory appreciation. Possible errors in
our own estimate of inventory appreciation is as likely to have led to
an undervaluation as an overvaluation of the wage gap in the early 1980s.
For Japan, the main problem arises from the possible inadequacy of the
base period. The extremely low share of labor costs in value added
during the 1950s and 1960s——20 to 30 percentage points lower than in
other industrial countries——may have partly resulted from an implicit
social consensus that a high profit rate was the best way to rebuild the
capital stock, rather than exclusively from a low marginal product of
labor. In this case, our estimate of the wage gap in the early 1980s
could be too high.
Third, an aggregate production function for a whole economic sector
is an inherently crude empirical tool because the conditions necessary
for aggregation over firms and industries are never fully satisfied,
particularly if workers are not paid their marginal products. Not much
can be done about this, short of confining studies at the firm or indus-
try level. However, there are some aspects of the production function
approach used here that are susceptible to further improvements. The— 49—
twothat are particularly worth singling out concern the complementary
between capital and energy and the evolution of the relative weights of
labor and capital over time. More work is needed to determine how much
of the energy input should be viewed as a complement to capital and how
much should be viewed as weakly separable. More work is also needed to
test our assumption that the evolution of the relative weights of labor
and capital was the same during the 1970s and early 1980s as during the
1950s and 1960s.
These limitations mean that the estimates are far from precise.
They do not mean that the estimated wage gaps for France, the Federal
Republic of Germany, and the United Kingdom merely reflects statistical
artefacts. There is more uncertainty in the case of Japan because of
the possible problem with the base period, but even there we doubt this
can completely explain the measured gap.
A major factor that reinforces us in our belief that the order of
magnitude of the gaps is right is the evolution of the unemployment
situation. Unemployment can be classical (caused by an unduly high real
wage rate), structural (caused by turnover and by regional and skill
mismatches), or Keynesian (caused by a deficiency of aggregate demand).
Thus, one should not expect a close cross—country correlation between the
unemployment rate and the size of the wage gap. However, as of early
1984, the unemployment rate in France, the Federal Republic of Germany,
and the United Kingdom is between 5 to 7 percentage points above our
estimate of the structural rate for the early 1980s (see the Statistical— 50—
Appendix)and this gap does not seem to be declining. 26 In contrast,
the unemployment rate is only 2 to 3 percentage points above the struc-
tural rate in the United States and Canada, and the spread is decreasing
from month to month. In Japan, the economic and social system is such
that the rise in unemployment has been quite moderate; nevertheless,
employment in manufacturing fell 4 percent from early 1974 to 1982. This
is striking, partly because the total labor force increased by 9 percent
during this period and partly because, as recently as the 1960s, employ-
ment in manufacturing was rising three times faster than the whole labor
force.
Last but not least, we regard our findings as particularly worrisome
because of the exchange rate developments of recent years. The extremely
sharp appreciation of the U.S. and Canadian dollar vis—à—vis, the other
major currencies has had major effects on the relative international
price competitiveness of the corresponding countries and has probably
affected the profitability of their exports of manufactures, decreasing
export profitability in the United States and Canada and increasing
export profitability in the other countries. It is not a good omen
that, despite these developments, there still seems to be a real wage
problem for the manufacturing sector as a whole In most of the large
industrial countries outside North America.— 51— J.R.Artus
STATISTICAL APPENDIX
Value added and labor cost in manufacturing
The data on value added in manufacturing at factor cost in nominal
and real terms were obtained from national account statistics. The
national account data in nominal terms are net of inventory appreciation,
except for France and Italy. For France, we adjusted these data by using
an estImate of inventory appreciation derived from the data on inventory
appreciation for the whole nonagricultural economy. For Italy, we had
to make an even rougher adjustment on the basis of the observed relation
between inflation and inventory appreciation in the other five countries.
A problem with the data on value added in real terms is that they
are derived by using the double—deflation method. As Bruno (1984) has
shown, double deflation may introduce a downward bias in the measurement
of the growth rate of real value added when the average price of raw
materials and energy changes monotonically relative to the price of out-
put. Actually, there is little risk of a double—deflation bias because
of changes in raw material prices as far as the whole 1973—82 period is
concerned. In relative terms, the average price of raw materials used
in manufacturing declined slowly from 1955 to 1972, rose sharply in
1973—74, declined sharply in 1975, then entered a new period of slow
decline interrupted by a brief rise in 1978—79. Thus, as long as the
weights used for recent years are not based on the abnormal relative
price of 1973—74, which is not the case in any of the seven countries
considered here, the bias due to the change in the relative price of- 52- APPENDIX
raw materials will be small. The doubling in the real price of energy
from 1972 to 1982, coming after a period of gradual decline, is a more
serious problem. Whenever possible, we have sought to avoid this poten-
tial source of bias by using series of real value added based on post—
1973 weights from 1972 onwards and on pre—1973 weights for 1955—72. But
for four countries, the United States, Canada, France, and Italy, this
could not be done because national account statistics based on post—1973
weights are not yet available. For these countries, therefore, the esti-
mate of X in model A for the post—1972 period may be downward biased.
However, a comparison of the data on real value added based on post—1973
weights with the data based on pre—1973 weights for Japan, the Federal
Republic of Germany, and the United Kingdom suggests that the bias is not
very large (say, an average of 0.2 to 0.3 percentage points per annum for
the whole period 1973—82). There is no problem in model B because the
cost of energy is not subtracted from gross output.
The data on labor cost were also obtained from national account
statistics. Labor costs include not only the wage bill, but also all
fringe benefits, employers' social security contributions, and employment
and payroll taxes.
Man—hours worked in manufacturing
For all countries except France, the data were provided by the U.S.
Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Office of Productivity
and Technology, hereafter referred to as the BLS. The data are for man-
hours worked, except for the United States where the only data available— 53- APPENDIX
are for man—hours paid. For France, the series for the whole manufactur-
ing sector were derived by aggregating the series for the food, interme-
diate, capital, and consumer goods industries provided by the Institute
National de la Statistique et des Etudes Economiques (INSEE).
Overall unemployment and vacancy rates
The data on unemployment and vacancies were obtained from Main
Economic Indicators, OECD, Paris, various issues. The data on unem-
ployment are in percent of the civilian labor force, except for Japan,
France, and the United Kingdom, where they are in percent of the total
labor force. The data on vacancies are in percent of the civilian labor
force for the Federal Republic of Germany; in percent of the total labor
force for Japan, France, and the United Kingdom; and in index form for
the United States and Canada.
The unemployment rate corresponding to a situation of high employ-
ment in the whole economy was estimated by using the Beveridge—Curve
method (see main text). The estimates are: for the United States,
3.4 percent for 1955—69, 4.8 percent for 1972—74, and 5.7 percent for
1977—80; for Canada, 3.4 percent for 1955—68, 5.5 percent for 1972—74,
and 7.2 percent for 1977—80; for Japan, 1.1 percent for 1955—71, 1.3
percent for 1972—78, and 1.6 percent for 1978—80; for France, 1 percent
for 1955—68, 2.6 percent for 1972—78, and 3.6 percent for 1979—80; for
the Federal Republic of Germany, 0.7 percent for 1961—71 and 2.2 percent
for 1975—80; and for the United Kingdom, 1.2 percent for 1955—66, 1.8
percent for 1969—71, 2.6 percent for 1973—76, and 4.6 percent for— 54- APPENDIX
1978—80. No estimate is made for years for which the observations fell
in between two Beveridge curves. (In the present study, an estimate is
required only for years corresponding to a cyclical peak for the number
of man—hours worked in manufacturing.) For Italy, the Beveridge—Curve
method could not be used because there is no data on vacancies. From
1955 to 1974, we used a "trend—through—peaks" method, with the unemploy-
ment rate at each cyclical peak in employment assumed equal to U. For
the 1980 peak, we assumed somewhat arbitrarily that U was equal to 6.5
percent, about 1 percentage point above the unemployment rate reached
at the 1974 cyclical peak.
Gross fixed capital stock in manufacturing
First, estimates of gross fixed capital stock in manufacturing
without adjustment for changes in its mean age were derived from data
on gross fixed capital formation in constant prices by employing the
perpetual inventory method, which consists of cumulating past investment
flows and deducting the equipment discarded from the stock. Except for
Japan, the calculation starts from a benchmark estimate of the capital
stock at the beginning of 1920. For Japan, the calculation starts from
a 1950 benchmark estimate. The capital stock at the beginning of year
t, K', was calculated by the formula:
t
(20) =K"ert + E (1 —4) At_i t 0 i=1
1
whereert is the proportion of the initial (1920) capital stock that
remains at the beginning of year t, At_i is the capital stock installed— 55— APPENDIX
inyear t—i; is the proportion of the capital stock corresponding
to At_i that has been retired by the beginning of year t; t is zero at
the beginning of 1920; and At_i is set equal to zero before 1920.
In the calculation, it is assumed that the capital stock installed
in year t is a lag function of the investment flows,
(21) At =0.30It + 0.50 It_i + 0.20 1t—2
where the coefficients take into account the average time needed for
new projects to be completed and become fully productive.27
The calculations were made separately for machinery and equipment,
and for structures, with an average service life of 15 years for machinery
and equipment and 35 years for structures. 28 Actual retirements from
capital stock accumulated after 1920 were calculated following a Winfrey
S—3 distribution, with discards starting at 45 percent of the average
life. 29 Special adjustments were made for damages suffered during World
War II. Moreover, the energy price increases of 1973—74 and 1979—80 were
estimated to have brought about the early discard of, respectively, 10
percent of the capital stock of early 1974 during 1974—76 and 10 percent
of the capital stock of early 1980 during 1980—82. (For further expla-
nation on these adjustments for energy price increases, see main text.)
Data on gross fixed capital formation in manufacturing valued at
constant prices and disaggregated into machinery and equipment, and
structures, were obtained from the following sources.
Canada: Series for 1926—81, Fixed Capital Flows and Stocks 1926—78,
Statistics Canada, Ottawa, 1980, and subsequent issues.- 56- APPENDIX
United States: Series for 1920—82, unpublished data supplied by
Mr. John Musgrave, U.S. Department of Commerce, Social and Economic
Statistics Administration, Bureau of Economic Analysis.
Japan: Series for 1950—81 on total gross fixed capital formation
in manufacturing in current prices, Annual Report on National Income
Statistics, Economic Planning Agency, Government of Japan, various issues.
These series were deflated by using the deflator of private investment in
plant and equipment for the whole economy available from the same source.
The series in constant prices were disaggregated into machinery and equip-
ment, and structures, on the basis of data supplied by the Ministry of
International Trade and Industry, Japan.
France: Series for 1920—69, "L'Evaluation du Capital Fixe Produc—
tif, Jacques Mairesse, in Les Collections de L'INSEE, Serie C, No. 18—19
(November 1972). Series for 1970—81, unpublished data supplied by
Mr. Jacques Mairesse, INSEE, France.
Federal Republic of Germany: Series for 1920—66, Wolfgang Kirner,
Zeitreihen für das Anlageverm5gen der Wirtschaftbereiche in der Bundes—
republik Deutschland, Berlin, 1969. Series for 1967—81, based on data
provided by IFO Institute.
Italy: Series for 1921—50, Sommario Di StatisticheStoriche
Dell'Italia, 1861—1965, Instituto Centrale Di Statistica, Rome, 1968.
Series for 1951—81, National Accounts for OECD Countries, Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development, various issues. These sources
provide only aggregate data. The disaggregation of data into machinery-57- PE
and equipment, and structures is based on the study lo'stocktdi capitale
nell'industria Italiana, Centro Studi Confindustria, Rome, 1979, and more
recent data provided by Dott. Giuseppe Rosa of Centro Studi Confindustria.
The series for Italy refer to manufacturing, mining, and utilities.
United Kingdom: Series for 1920—38, Domestic Capital Formation in
the United Kingdom 1920—38, C.H. Feinstein, Cambridge University Press,
1965. Series for 1939—45, "The Stock of Fixed Capital in the United
Kingdom in 1961," G.A. Dean, Journal of the Royal Statistical Society,
Series A, Vol. 127, Part 3, 1964. Series for 1949—82, National Income
and Expenditure, U.K. Central Statistical Office, various issues.
Data on investment for 1982 were obtained from various published
and unpublished sources or were based on Staff estimates; they must be
considered very preliminary.
In the calculation of the series on capital stock, the post—1965
data on investment for the United States were adjusted by netting out
the pollution abatement investment obtained from the June issues of the
Survey of Current Business, U.S. Department of Commerce, various years.
For Canada and Japan, the post—1969 data on investment were cut by 5
percent to take into account that, with the intensification of the
efforts to reduce pollution, there had also been a marked increase in
the proportion of investments that do not contribute to value added in
these two countries. (See main text for further explanation.)
Second, estimates of the mean age of the capital stock were obtained
from the same investment data, with the same adjustments for war, energy- 58- APPENDIX
priceincreases and the drive to reduce pollution. Here also, the cal-
culations were made separately for machinery and equipment, and for
structures. The mean age (Z) was calculated by the formula:
/ n
(22) Z =(t.Kert + i (1 —4j) A...)/K
0 i=1
1
Foreach of the two types of capital goods, the estimate of the
capital stock adjusted for deviations of the mean age from the 1967 level
was then defined as:
(23) Kt =K1et —Z1967)
t
where the rate of embodied technical progress (4) is equal to 0.02
for machinery and equipment, and 0.05 for structures.30
Finally, data on the total capital stock were obtained by summing
the adjusted stocks of machinery and equipment, and of structures.
Energy use in manufacturing
Data on total final consumption of energy in manufacturing in mil-
lion tons of oil equivalent were obtained from Energy Balances of OECD
Countries, International Energy Agency, OECD, Paris, various issues.31
The data excludes the consumption of energy products for purposes other
than energy generation.
Indices of the average price of energy inputs in the manufacturing
sector were provided by the International Energy Agency. Estimates of
average prices in units of local currency were derived by usingthese
indices and the data on prices of individual energy products in 1978
published in Energy Conservation in the International Energy Agency—1978— 59- APPENDIX
Review,International Energy Agency, OECD, Paris, 1979; in Doblin (1982);
and in International Energy_Evaluation System. International Energy
Prices, 1955—1980, Service Report (SR/STID/81—21) of the Energy Infor-
mation Administration, U.S. Department of Energy, December 1981.— 60— J.R.Artus
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FOOTNOTES
1 am indebted to Joshua Felman, Morris Goldstein, Mohsin Khan,
Malcolm Knight, and many colleagues in area departments for helpful com-
ments and suggestions. Gertrud Windsperger provided invaluable research
assistance.
2 Malinvaud (1977, 1982) presents an updated theoretical analysis of
the relation between inappropriate real wages and unemployment. Sachs
(1979, 1983), Branson and Rotemberg (1980), Drze and Modigliani (1981),
Bruno and Sachs (1982), Giersch (1982), Kouri, Braga de Macedo, and
Viscio (1982), Grubb, Jackman, and Layard (1983), Knight (1983), Stein—
herr (1983), and Lipschitz and Schadler (1984) are some of the main
advocates of the view that the level of the real wage rate is a major
obstacle to a return to high employment in European countries. Sachs
(1983) and others found evidence of inappropriately high real wages in
the United States and in Japan, but they did not detect marked effects
on unemployment in these two countries.
3 There is also some evidence that in a number of countries the share
of labor costs in value added has risen in other sectors during the past
decade and a half, but this evidence is difficult to interpret. Sectors
such as transport, communication, and utilities are largely under public
control in most industrial countries so that the profit motive does not
play an important role in determining their demand for labor. In the
private service sector, it is difficult to define the share of labor
costs because of the high proportion of persons working on their own
account.— 65—
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4 Among the studies listed in footnote 1 on p. 1, Knight (1983) and
Llpschitz and Schadler (1984) use a production function approach toallow
for the effect of changes in the relative availability of labor and capi—
tal on the warranted share of labor costs in value added, but they ignore
the possible effect of changes in production techniques and in the price
of energy on this share. The other studies assume that any sustained gap
between the growth of the real wage rate defined from the employer's
standpoint and the growth of labor productivity implies a disequilibrium
situation. Basevi et. al. (1983) have rightly stressed the drawbacks of
such an assumption and the need for a comprehensive production function
approach.
5 A discussion of these dynamic effects can be found in Malinvaud
(1977, 1982) and Bruno and Sachs (1982).
6 The assumption of constant returns to scale was tested as part of
the empirical study by adding a scale parameter to equation (1). This
parameter was not found to be significantly different from unity.
7 The demand for labor is derived under the assumption that the flow
of capital services is given. To derive it, it is more convenient from
a mathematical standpoint to use equation (1) rather than itslinear
approximation represented by equation (2).
8 A possible solution would be to have a separate distributed lag on
w/p and Y, but here again there would be a problem of multicollinearity.
The major change in w/p took place in the early 1970s and it would be— 66—
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difficult to disentangle its effect on the demand for labor from the
effect of the likely concomitant change in the rate of technical progress.
9 Consideration of the conditions in the steel and shipbuilding indus-
tries in European countries during the 1970s and early 1980s suggests that
a disequilibrium situation involving low or negative profitability and
an excess of labor can at times last more than a decade.
10 In European countries, it is the wage explosion of late 1969 that
is usually considered to mark the beginning of the real wage problem. In
the United States and Canada, the beginning of the problem Is usually
traced to the 1973—74 oil price increase.
11 For the United States, the only data available are for man—hours
paid.
12 The gross capital stock refers to the equipment that has not been
discarded. In this context, if some equipment has lost x percent of its
initial efficiency, then x percent of the equipment is considered to have
been discarded. By contrast, the net capital stock excludes not only
discards, but also the depreciation of the equipment that has not been
discarded. This depreciation reflects the fact that while the equipment
still has its original efficiency, its remaining expected life expectancy
is shorter than on the date of purchase. In the main, the net capital
stock can be viewed as the discounted value of the expected stream of
capital services to be derived from the existing capital stock. Thus,
normally, the net value of equipment will start declining well ahead of— 67—
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any decline in the flow of services that can be derived from that equip-
ment. For that reason, no attempt is made to use the net capital stock
in the present study.
13 The otherequations involve variables such as SL, SL, w/p, and L
that are not influenced by cyclical developments.
14 It has been argued that various other factors, especially the male—
female ratio, should be taken into account in the calculation of the
amount of labor input. This has led Perry (1971), Perloff and Wachter
(1980) and others to calculate weighted indices of man—hours, with the
weights based on the relative pay scales for the various components of
the labor force. However, for the manufacturing sector, these indices
have usually been found to deviate little from simple indices based on
the unweighted man—hours. A good review of issues related to the
measurement of labor services can be found in Baily (1981).
15 See the article on "Capital Expenditures by Business for Pollution
Abatement" in each June issue of the Survey of Current Business, U.S.
Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis. See also the
November 1982 issue.
16 For a discussion of the theoretical underpinning of the Beveridge
Curve, see Bowden (1980).
17 Before 1961, the data for the Federal Republic of Germany exclude
Berlin and Saarland; therefore, they are not directly comparable with the
data for subsequent years.— 68—
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18 The estimation was carried out with the minimum—distance estimation
routine of the Research Analysis Language (RAL) program. In order to
make possible the estimation of the production and share functions as a
system of two simultaneous equations, the variables in the share func-
tions were set at zero during 1970—82 or 1974—82, depending upon the
group of countries. The estimation was then carried out for the period
through 1982. The standard error of estimate of each equation was
recalculated after reducing the number of degrees of freedom for the
observations in the share functions corresponding to 1970—82 or 1974—82.
19 As explained in the Statistical Appendix, in the United States,
Canada, France, and Italy, the estimated value of At for 1973—82 in
model A may be biased downward to a small extent because the data on real
value added for this period are calculated on the basis of the pre—1973
relative price of energy.
20 The estimates are as follows (with a star indicating those that
are significant at the 5 percent level):
United United
StatesCanada Japan FranceGermany Italy Kingdom
o26.5* 33Q* 55.0* 395* 31.7* 377* 27.9*
(0.3) (0.2) (0.2) (0.2) (0.2) (0.1) (0.3)
0.57* 0.08 0.17 0.65* 0.59* —0.13 0.60
(0.07) (0.06) (0.09) (0.14) (0.10) (0.06) (0.42)
1.023* 0.135 0.159* Q•557* 0.403* 0.308* 0.771
(0.147) (0.070) (0.027) (0.143) (0.040) (0.053) (0.398)— 69—
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As these estimates are based on the ordinary least squares method,
they have the usual statistical properties. The standard errors are
often much larger than those presented in Table 3, but most of them are
still relatively small.
21 This methodassumes that SE and ln(K/E) were relatively stable
during the pre—1972 period. For Canada, where K/E was declnng at a
marked rate during the l96Os and early l97Os, the 1972—82 change in
ln(K/E) was calculated in terms of deviations from the 1962—72 tendency.
22 Thisestimate of can be compared to the E—K gross substitu-
tion elasticities of 0.133 for the U.S. manufacturing sector, 0.501 for
Canadian manufacturing in Ontario, and 0.650 for Canadian manufacturing
in British Columbia, obtained by Berndt and Wood (1979) on the basis of
pre—1972 data. It Implies that an increase in the price of energy may
lead to a decline in the demand for capital services. For example, a
100 percent increase in the price of energy could lead to an increase
in pK* of 15 percent (assuming that energy represents initially 15
percent of the total energy and capital cost), an increase in p* of
5 percent (assuming that energy represents initially 5 percent of the
total labor, capital, and energy cost), and a decline in the demand for
K* of 7 percent (assuming an elasticity of substitution of 0.7 between
K* and L and a fixed amount of L). With an elasticity of substitution
of 0.3 between K and E, the ratio of E to K would change by 30 percent.
The final result would be a drop in the demand for E of 32 percent and a— 70—
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drop in the demand for K of 2 percent (averaging to the drop in K* of 7
percent given the 15 percent weight on E and the 85 percent weight on K).
23 From equation (12), we see that if L is one percent greater than
L, the equilibrium share corresponding to K/L will differ from that
corresponding to K/L by 8(o +t) (l— — t) percent. Based on the
estimates presented in table 3, this difference ranges from plus 0.2 per-
cent in the United States to 0.05 percent in Canada.
24 It can be noted that this adjustment is more sizable than it
appears because in France, Italy, the United Kingdom, and Japan, payroll
taxes rose sharply during 1979—82 so that the growth of the take—home
wage was even lower than the growth of the gross wage considered here
(see Steinherr (1983)). By contrast, in the United States, payroll taxes
were reduced during this period, decreasing the need for a cut in the
take—home wage.
25 The present study ends in 1982; however, the preliminary data
available for 1983 suggest that, except in the United Kingdom, little
progress was made toward adjustment during that year. The share of labor
costs in value added in manufacturing may have declined by 1 to 2 per-
centage points in the United States, Canada, France, and the Federal
Republic of Germany, and risen by 1 to 2 percentage points in Japan and
Italy. Account being taken of cyclical developments, this represented
probably a small decline in the wage gap, by say 2 percentage points,
in France and Germany, a small rise in Japan, and not much change in the- 71-
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other countries. In contrast, the share of labor costs may have declined
by about 4 percentage points in the United Kingdom which, once taken
account of the modest economic recovery, may represent a decline in the
wage gap of 4 or 5 percentage points.
26 A comprehensive empirical analysis showing that increases in labor
shares (or in product wages) have had a negative effect on employment
growth in Europe can be found in Steinherr (1983).
27 Extensive studies of the lag from start of construction to comple-
tion have been made by Mayer (1960). The coefficients of equation (21)
are based on Mayer's result and an assumed start—up period of two quarters.
28 These estimates are based on the 1942 edition of Bulletin F of the
U.S. Treasury Department, which remains standard for calculations of
capital stocks in the United States. A recent survey by Blades (1983)
found that calculation of capital stocks made in other industrial coun-
tries are normally based on discard rates similar to the U.S. rates. The
two major exceptions are Japan, with more rapid discard rates, and the
United Kingdom, with slower discard rates. Given that most capital goods
are similar throughout the industrial world, however, there was little
reason in the context of the present study to assume that their economic
efficiency" changed persistently at markedly different rates in the
various countries.
29 The Winfrey S—3 distribution is described in fixed Nonresidential
Business capital in the United States, 1925—73, National Technical
Information Service (Springfield, Virginia).— 72—
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30 The estimates of 0.02 and 0.05 wereinitially suggested by Solow
in his pioneering article (1957). Econometric results consistent with
these estimates were obtained in Artus and Turner (1978).
31 The data published by the InternationalEnergy Agency refer to the
industrial sector, but the definition of the industrial sector used by
this Agency is comparable to the normal definition of the manufacturing
sector in national account statistics.